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ABSTRACT 
New Labour’s performance in office–as an orchestrator of economic and social change–is situ-
ated against, and evaluated by reference to, two sets of legacies: legacies inherited from the years 
of Conservative political dominance after 1979; and legacies brought to power by New Labour. 
The paper argues that the first set of legacies was deep and enduring, and threw a long shadow 
forward. It argues that the second set of legacies were highly coherent and intellectually in-
formed, but cumulatively involved a diminution in the capacity of the state. The result has been a 
two-term government that is sufficiently superficially successful to win a third term; but which 
has yet seriously to transform the legacies it inherited: to our misfortune, and ultimately–in elec-
toral terms–also probably to its own. This paper is based on my study of New Labour’s domestic 
policy–Prolonged Labour: The Slow Birth of New Labour Britain; I have also co-authored a 
study of New Labour’s policy towards Iraq–Blair’s War–which was published by Polity Press in 
2004. 
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Tony Blair’s foreign policy–at least its most visible part―needs no explanation to 
an American audience, intellectual or otherwise. The UK’s New Labour Prime Minister 
was George Bush’s enthusiastic point man in the war against the Taliban, and he re-
mains his key ally in the invasion and occupation of Iraq. But what is less known here, of 
course, is Tony Blair the domestic politician: the leader of the most successful Labour 
Government in the UK certainly for at least four decades, arguably perhaps the most 
successful Labour Government ever. And that domestic record needs also to be known 
and thought about in the United States too: for these reasons at least. The first is that the 
UK and the U.S. are in many ways very similar sorts of society, with similar economies, 
similar political systems, parallel world roles and shared points of cultural reference. 
The UK and the U.S. are very different places, of course, but the similarities matter. The 
UK often has a way of holding up to the United States dimensions of its own future, par-
ticularly when the UK demonstrates, as it is doing now, some of the costs of empire and 
of the hubris of world leadership. And particularly for the American Left―for progres-
sive democratic forces in the United States――the nature and potential of European so-
cial democracy is an important point of reference. The British Labour Party occupies a 
special, and in ways a marginal, position within the family of European social democ-
ratic parties: but it is a member nonetheless, and as the Democratic Party in the United 
States struggles with this key issue of how best to reconnect the party to its traditional 
electoral base, there are real lessons to be learned from the way in which Tony 
Blair―from a not dissimilar position of weakness and despair―led the British Labour 
Party back to power after nearly twenty years of Center-Right dominance in the UK. It is 
not possible, of course, in one presentation, to do full justice to the entire range of poli-
cies initiated by the New Labour leadership. Since it came to power in 1997, the New 
Labour government has pursued a range of constitutional changes, and a set of foreign 
policy issues, that I will not touch on here. But they have also set a new course for the 
party, and for the country, in the area of economy and society. It is in the areas of eco-
nomic growth and social change that the U.S. parallels and points of comparison are at 
their sharpest and most relevant, and it is on those, therefore, that I will focus now. 
 
I 
To understand the performance of particular governments, the first thing you 
have to understand is the legacies that surround them: both the legacies they inherit, 
and the ones they carry into power with them. The legacies they inherit set the context of 
action, and give them their agenda and balance of forces. The legacies they bring then 
shape their response to that agenda, and widen the agenda itself. They certainly did in 
New Labour’s case.  
So, first: the two sides of the legacy: the legacy inherited and the legacy brought. 
 
The legacy inherited 
Economically, the immediate inheritance was more favorable than was tradition-
ally the case with incoming Labour governments. There was no wartime austerity as in 
1945. There were no balance of payments/sterling crises as in 1964. There was no work-
ing-class militancy as in 1974. There was just the legacy of four years of quiet economic   3
growth, after the longest recession in UK twentieth-century economic history: the one 
that ran from 1990 to 1994. On the surface, the economic legacy inherited by New La-
bour in 1997 looked uncharacteristically benign. 
But the longer-term economic legacy was very different. Surface appearances 
here, as elsewhere, were in fact profoundly misleading: and in 1997 the UK electorate 
really knew it, which was why John Major’s government was not able to benefit that 
year from any “feel good” factor triggered by economic growth. Because over a thirty-
five year period from 1962, the UK economy had slipped from being the world’s second 
most successful capitalist economy to being the eighteenth. It had fallen from being one 
of Western Europe’s high-wage economies to being, apart from Ireland, the economy in 
northern Europe in which wages were generally low. An economy that had once been 
the workshop of the world had, from 1983, become a net importer of manufactured 
goods on an annual basis: something that, apart from in wartime, it had not been for two 
centuries. Centers of economic excellence remained, of course―in the financial sector, in 
aerospace, and in pharmaceuticals―all ironically, given Thatcherism’s antipathy to state 
spending, centers of economic excellence for which the state itself was a major consumer 
of the products on offer. But otherwise the economy that New Labour inherited in 1997 
was characterized by a series of performance gaps when compared to the achievements 
and dominant characteristics of its major competitors: an investment gap, a skills gap, a 
productivity gap, a living standards gap, even a social capital gap. 
The economy that the New Labour Government inherited in 1997 was, in com-
parative terms, a low-wage, long-hours, low investment and low growth one. It was one 
sustained by a labor force which, on average and in general, actually possessed lower 
skills and enjoyed fewer rights at work than was then commonplace in Western Europe 
as a whole. In 1997 UK-based workers were actually putting in 175 more hours of work 
each year than their German equivalents, and a staggering 186 hours more than their 
Swedish ones. 186 hours is nearly five working weeks: five weeks of extra leisure and 
consumption! Indeed, and for that reason among others, the UK economy in the late 
1990s was being increasingly used by foreign investors―particularly American and Japa-
nese investors―as simply an assembly point, as a space in which to build goods that 
were designed elsewhere, and which were then sold on into a more prosperous and cor-
poratist Europe: New Labour inherited, that is, what was widely labeled at the time as an off-
shore screwdriver and warehouse economy, one largely in the second tier of economies within the 
ever-expanding European Union. 
Socially, as befits such an economy, an appearance of generalized and rising af-
fluence served in 1997 to obscure an underlying crisis in UK society more generally that 
the Thatcher years had only intensified. Over a thirty-year period, it is true, the old de-
pressed northern working class―the traditional image of the UK labor movement―had 
largely vanished. The UK had de-industrialized more rapidly than any other leading 
capitalist nation: its cotton workers and its miners had been replaced by workers in light 
engineering, by white collar workers in large private companies and, in the UK case, by 
a huge expansion in public-sector employment: teachers, social workers, nurses and ad-
ministrators. There were 750,000 miners in the UK in 1959. In 1997 there were less than 
15,000; and in the process a new and largely prosperous middle class had indeed con-
solidated itself. The UK had its own suburban revolution in the 1970s and 1980s to mir-
ror the American one.   4
And like the U.S., as the UK suburbs had prospered, the cities had not. New La-
bour inherited in 1997 a depleted urban housing stock, an under-resourced transport system, and 
significant concentrations of poverty in those urban areas. In 1994  one child in three lived in 
officially-defined poverty in the UK. That proportion had more than tripled in twenty 
years, and went hand-in-hand with significant levels of generalized illiteracy and innu-
meracy in the bottom sections of the social order. On the government’s own figures, 
more than seven million adults had problems with basic reading and almost twice that 
number had  problems with math, in a labor force in 1997 of twenty-nine million. Private 
affluence, that is, but also public squalor, and depleted social capital. By 1997 too, three 
generations of immigration from the new Commonwealth had combined with native ra-
cism to concentrate much of that poverty―and the associated unemployment and poor 
levels of social provision―into the urban ghettos of the decaying northern towns and cit-
ies into which those immigrants had been obliged to settle. Go as an American tourist to 
London, Cambridge or Stratford, stay in the center, and you see one England: part of 
that belt of European prosperity that stretched, and still stretches, in a banana shape 
wedge from London through Brussels to northern Italy. But go out of London, drive 
through the English North West, and a very different, and a distinctly second-world sort 
of England awaits you. It certainly did in 1979. By 1997 New Labour inherited a divided so-
ciety: divided socially, regionally, ethnically and in terms of its income and wealth―a society di-
vided into what Will Hutton called the 40:30:30 society―40 percent prosperous and secure, 
30 percent getting by but financially stretched and in job terms insecure, and 30 percent 
in real and deepening poverty. In fact, in 1997 income distribution in the UK was more 
unequal than at any time since official records began: and those records had been in 
existence for more than a century by then. 
Culturally, all this was filtered through the legacy of Thatcherism. From 1979 the 
UK had experienced its own Reagan Revolution. The iron lady had reset public debate 
in a neoliberal direction: rolling back the state; privatizing state industries where she 
could and introducing internal markets where she could not; and extolling the virtues of 
free markets, self-reliance and individual social mobility, in a quintessentially American 
manner. That Thatcherite revolution had shaped the thinking of political and cultural 
elites in the UK and given immense self-confidence to the middle-class Conservatives 
working in the private sector; but it too had run into buffers by 1997. New Labour inher-
ited an electorate in which strong residues of social democratic, as distinct from neolib-
eral, thought still prevailed; and it inherited a labor force, significant sections of which 
still worked in the public welfare sector. Teachers in the UK were and remain the La-
bour Party’s most solid electoral supporters. Margaret Thatcher never took more than 43 
percent of the popular vote; and no Tory government, even hers, ever dared to privatize 
the health service, or indeed even to privatize higher education. Economically and socially, 
that is, New Labour came to power heavily constrained, but less constrained than it knew: cultur-
ally and politically, though it came to power with its old values under pressure, it still enjoyed a 
significant degree of wriggle room1 that it was actually slow to exploit. 
 
                                                 
1This term has now become academically respectable. See B. Clift and J. Tomlinson, “Fiscal policy 
and capital mobility: the construction of economic policy rectitude in Britain and France,” New 
Political Economy 9,4 (December 2004): 531   5
The legacy brought 
For one of the tragedies of New Labour–at least a tragedy visible with hindsight–
is that the width of that wriggle room was seriously underestimated by Tony Blair and 
his colleagues in 1997; and for very good reason. For they came to power with legacies 
of their own, legacies that left them, at one and the same time, electorally cautious and 
programmatically very, very conservative. 
The incoming New Labour team were electorally cautious for two reasons: they 
approached the 1997 election after four election defeats in a row, and with the salutary 
disappointment of 1992―when their predecessors in the leadership effectively ran a vic-
tory rally ahead of the election, so confident were they of victory―with that salutary dis-
appointment before them, and fresh in their mind. The New Labour team did not expect 
to lose in 1997, but they anticipated a very close result. They did not expect―no one did 
―that the result would be the landslide that it was. As Tony Benn put it at the time, in 
1997 the New Labour leaders “went to the beach to have a paddle and were hit by a tidal 
wave.” This was tsunami politics with a vengeance. New Labour also came into power 
knowing that no Labour Government had ever won a full second term. The Blair gov-
ernment entered power expecting to lose it again, and quickly. The Party had won a 
landslide, but its leaders feared that votes won so easily could be lost with equal speed. 
Electorally that meant that both before and after 1997, New Labour policymakers tar-
geted, not their core supporters, but rather the Conservative floating voter and, to win 
that floating vote, positioned themselves programmatically to the right of their core 
base. New Labour won in 1997 by promising to be better Conservatives than the Conser-
vatives themselves, and once in power set out to prove it. The first Blair government had 
its own post-Thatcherite agenda, but its key focus was on the concerns and electoral pro-
clivities of floating Thatcherite voters.  
In consequence and programmatically, New Labour entered office in a conservative 
frame of mind because that is how Blair and his team had chosen to play the policy 
game after 1992. They had seen the string of 1980s defeats―the wasted years―and de-
duced from that that Old Labour policies had to be shed. They had seen the 1992 elec-
tion  defeat―and blamed that on the “tax and spend” reputation of the Labour Party that 
the Tories had so effectively exploited in their 1992 election campaign―and deduced 
from that the need to shed that reputation. In consequence New Labour went into power 
emphasizing their “newness,” but defining that newness less against their Conservative 
opponents than against the record of their own Party’s immediate past. They came to 
power stressing their fiscal conservatism, and their newfound ease with the forces of pri-
vate capitalism. They came to power as Neil Kinnock said later, having put a “huge dis-
tance in reality and in public perception” between themselves and Old Labour. Pro-
grammatically that distance involved the New Labour leadership shedding virtually 
every policy weapon and radical commitment of Labour Governments and Labour Op-
positions in the past. The policy weapons went. The radical commitments went. There 
was to be no public ownership, no planning agreements, no import controls, no exten-
sive state aid to industry, no State bank to direct investment to private industry, no spe-
cial deals with the trade unions, no increases in direct taxation―indeed no increases in 
public spending in the first two years of a Labour Government greater than the Conser-
vatives themselves had already planned. There would be no pulling out of Europe, as 
the Labour Party manifesto of 1983 had proposed; and no unilateral nuclear disarma-  6
ment. Out of the window went any commitment to greater income equality, or any ex-
tension of industrial democracy. What came in instead was New Labour’s much 
vaunted and Clinton-inspired “third way.” 
New Labour’s “third way” is a very serious thing: a set of policies, and an under-
lying understanding of how the world works, which has been very carefully put to-
gether. This is serious intellectual politics, to a quite remarkable degree. Its UK archi-
tects―largely, as far as I can tell, Blair and Brown themselves, and the circles around 
them―drew heavily on the new thinking about globalization. Anthony Giddens was 
clearly a key player here. They drew heavily on new growth theory in economics. Gor-
don Brown once famously declared his belief in something called “post-Keynesian neo-
classical endogenous growth theory,” and was roundly teased for his pains, but all the 
economists reading this will have some general sense of what he was talking about. The 
New Labour leadership drew heavily on the new communitarian writings of people like 
Etzioni, and on the new thinking on the importance of social capital from Robert Put-
nam and the like. And, indeed, when in power, they drew heavily on the many investi-
gations, reports and data sets whose gathering they themselves initiated. New Labour’s 
“third way” was, and is, an orientation and a program which is seriously informed both 
intellectually and empirically. It is deadly serious politics; and that marks it out, in my 
view, from most Labour Party orientations and programs of the past.  New Labour can 
be criticized for many things: but I don’t think that it can be accused, as Labour Govern-
ments could in the past, of excessive amounts of superficiality, inconsistency, U-turning, 
or tacking to every temporary wind.  On the contrary, New Labour ministers have stuck 
to their guns for two parliaments now: long enough indeed for us to see exactly what 
they are about, and to be able to determine whether what they are about actually works. 
This clarity has been at its sharpest in New Labour’s economics, in the policies 
emerging from Gordon Brown’s finance ministry, the UK Treasury.  New Labour en-
tered office in 1997 committed not simply to better rates of economic growth than the 
Tories. It entered office actually committed in 1997 to raising the “trend rate of growth of 
the economy,” in other words, to pulling the UK up the international league table of 
competitive performance, and to do so by making a sharp break from what was the real-
ity, as distinct from the rhetoric, of the Thatcher growth strategy: namely that the UK 
economy was one whose growth depended, as it did in the Thatcher years, on the main-
tenance of low wages and long hours of work. Tony Blair was very clear on that when 
addressing the Trades Union Congress in September 1997: that there was “the Tory way 
–inequality, insecurity and low wages for the many, very high rewards for the few …,” 
which he absolutely rejected; and there was New Labour’s way: a government commit-
ted to fairness at work … based on a hard-headed analysis of how to build a high wage, 
high skills, high investment and high employment economy: hard-headed analysis and 
then total determination to achieve it. 
New Labour, that is, came into office convinced that, given globalization and the 
new dot.com technologies, the old relationship between state and market was not on. As 
Gordon Brown put it on more than one occasion, “crude free market dogma” (the That-
cher version), failed to meet the requirements of the moment because it “did not encour-
age long term relations and commitments” and because it  gave “no incentive for people 
to invest in the future.” Likewise, the “Old Labour language–tax, spend and borrow, 
nationalization, state planning, isolationism, full-time jobs for men while women stay at   7
home” was “equally inappropriate” to a world which now required state initiatives that 
sought not to replace private market forces but rather to work in partnership with them. 
The job of the modern state, in the New Labour lexicon from its earliest articulations, 
was to coordinate investment in knowledge, skills and infrastructure. It was to act ―in Gordon 
Brown’s telling phrase–as “the lubricant in the engine of the … economy, oiling its wheels 
and allowing it to run faster and more smoothly without the damage and regular break-
downs we have seen so often in the recent past.” Armed with the new growth theory, 
the New Labour leadership entered office full of confidence: they had the confidence 
fully to embrace free trade (and to reject protectionism or competitive devaluation) as 
adequate responses to intensified international competition. They had the confidence to 
eschew public ownership and to embrace the growth potential of only lightly state-
regulated private enterprise. They were determined to focus macroeconomic policy on 
the creation of stability by prioritizing the control of inflation and the containment of 
public spending. They focused their industrial policy on the encouragement of small 
business, the attraction of foreign direct investment, and the strengthening of investment 
in research and development. And they put educational reform at the heart of that in-
dustrial policy―they make re-skilling their central labor market concern, and “Educa-
tion, Education, Education” their central mantra―while they combined retention of the 
Thatcherite industrial relations changes with new initiatives on the minimum wage and 
the movement of people from welfare to work. In other words, they were Clintonesque. 
As a result, New Labour entered office in 1997 determined to privilege policies to 
encourage progress in four areas: investment in industry, through tight and disciplined 
tax policies geared to “keeping inflation low and as stable as possible”; investment in in-
frastructure, through the extension of public-private partnerships in areas as diverse as 
training, education, defense, transport housing and regional policy; investment in employ-
ment opportunities, through active labor-market policies to move people from welfare to 
work; and investment in people, with life-long learning initiatives, better industrial train-
ing and higher school standards. That way, they believed, would enable them to find a 
third, and a superior, way between the various models of capitalism on offer around 
them: combining the efficiency and dynamism of the American model with the social 
cohesion and basic justice of the European one, while avoiding the social inequalities of 
American free-market capitalism and the labor-market inflexibilities of Germany and 
Sweden. A new third way model! In the light of all that, it is not really surprising that 
May 1997 was such an exciting time to be on the Center-Left in the UK. For after eight-
een years of Conservative rule, we at last had again a government that was intellectually 
powerful, economically ambitious and socially progressive, and a government, more-
over, that unexpectedly found itself in possession of the largest parliamentary majority 
of any UK government in modern history. “We were still a young country,” Blair told us 
with a future to win; and lots of us, in the euphoria of the moment, were tempted to be-
lieve him.   8
II 
The policy pursued 
The key thing to grasp, as we try to determine if that future is currently being 
w o n ,  i s  t h a t  i n  t h e  b r o a d e s t  s e n s e  N e w  L a bour did exactly what it promised to do, 
and―on its economic and social agenda at least―very little else. You couldn’t spot the 
invasion of Iraq from the detail of the 1997 election manifesto. Obviously the events of 
9/11 and the strange linkage to Iraq that followed were all entirely unanticipable in 
1997: but go back and read that 1997 election document now, and the main lines of what 
was to transpire economically and socially are there for all to see. Not the detail, of 
course, not entirely anyway, but the main lines of march certainly, and to a quite re-
markable degree. 
l. Monetary Stability and Fiscal Prudence. The Treasury immediately handed over 
control of interest rates to the Bank of England, creating a division of labor not entirely 
dissimilar to that between the Executive and the Federal Reserve in the United States, 
though with the UK Government still setting the inflation target; and then Gordon 
Brown held public spending back for two years to meet that target, to pare down the 
National Debt, and to leave rates of income tax unchanged. That fiscal prudence was en-
shrined in two new Treasury rules that still operate today: the golden rule that over the 
economic cycle the government would borrow only to invest and that current spending 
would be met from taxation; and the sustainable investment rule―that, as a proportion of 
national income, public debt would be held at a prudent and stable level over the eco-
nomic cycle. That didn’t stop generous funding for the public services in New Labour’s 
second term, but it did delay that spending until growth was assured and inflation heav-
ily contained. 
2. Manufacturing an Economic Strategy. That pursuit of monetary stability and fis-
cal prudence was presented as the backdrop to policies designed to trigger economic 
growth from the private sector (particularly from the small business sector) and to 
strengthen the economy’s science base: to that end Gordon Brown introduced a string of 
measures, over a number of budgets, that cumulatively eased the level of taxation on 
businesses, scrapped many of the regulations constraining the small-business sector, of-
fered help with venture capital, marketing and networking, protected small businesses 
against late payments, and encouraged new business start-ups. Later indeed the Chan-
cellor launched a ten-year strategy to double public funding of basic R&D by 2008, and 
so on. All this was part of his perennial campaign to bridge the productivity gap be-
tween UK-based companies and those in the United States, Japan and Germany; all this 
was part of a sustained attempt to strengthen the dot.com side of the “new economy” 
(this from 1997) and, more recently, to strengthen UK-based manufacturing as a whole. 
New Labour by 2004 was packaging its business-friendly program as a set of seven pil-
lars designed to reinforce entrepreneurship and to trigger sustained manufacturing 
growth.2  
                                                 
2The seven pillars areas follows. “Pillar 1: Macro-economic stability…. Pillar 2: Investment … 
changes to the tax system which encourage entrepreneurship; assistance to investment in certain 
regions and by small companies; and encouragement of inward investment. Pillar 3:  Science and 
Innovation … the recently introduced R&D tax credit for large firms, and the continued expansion   9
3. Enhancing the Quantity and Quality of Publicly-Provided Welfare Services. The one 
area in which that pursuit of enhanced productivity has been easiest for New Labour, 
and where policy of late has been both most visible and most contentious, has been 
within the public sector itself. Policy on two fronts: (1) To achieve new levels of invest-
ment in the depleted rail and road system, schools, hospitals and prisons, and to achieve 
them without raising taxes and public borrowing, Gordon Brown has turned to the pri-
vate sector―in a series of joint ventures (the so called “Private Finance Initiative” inher-
ited from the Conservatives) in which private firms build schools and hospitals and the 
government leases them back. (2) Then, to balance the increase in funds to education 
and welfare services, New Labour has also created a set of what are called “Public Ser-
vice Agreements,” effectively productivity deals and output targets that link the flow of 
funds to increased efficiency in the public sector, so intensifying the work process there.  
4. Welfare to Work. From 1997 New Labour also made a series of powerful moves 
in the labor market, with again Gordon Brown as the key architect and advocate of pol-
icy changes here. From his first budget, within six weeks of being in office, the Chancel-
lor launched his New Deal―his American-style welfare-to-work program aimed initially 
at the young unemployed. In 1997 the young British unemployed were offered four 
choices in return for continued unemployment benefits: four―subsidized work with an 
employer, a voluntary organization or an environmental task force, or basic literacy 
training, but no longer a fifth option―no longer full benefits while remaining idle at 
home. New Labour ministers were and remain convinced that the pathway out of most 
modern forms of poverty is through paid work; and they have increasingly over time ex-
tended those offers―and those terms―to all unemployed workers, regardless of age and 
gender: incrementally extending the degree of compulsion as they have done so. The re-
sult is not yet a full-blown workfare state of the Wisconsin variety, but something akin 
to it is definitely on the way. 
5. Reskilling the Labour Force. What has accompanied that active labor-market pol-
icy, and softened its potentially draconian side effects, has been a series of moves to 
strengthen education and training in the UK. New Labour has tried, and is still trying, to 
trigger a skills revolution. It did so initially by giving everyone a voucher to be spent on 
re-skilling courses―the so-called “Individual Learning Accounts”―and by setting up a 
second-chance university aimed at enhancing industrial skills, the so-called University 
for Industry. It also tried to reactivate the UK system of apprenticeships, by using the 
trade unions as conduits for new training schemes. More recently the emphasis has 
shifted to the raising of basic levels of literacy and numeracy, and the focus of policy has 
been directed back at the schools. But for all the variation of detail, the general line of 
march remains unchanged. Education policy has genuinely replaced industrial policy 
for New Labour in the UK, as ministers have set higher and higher educational targets 
for first elementary schools and then secondary schools, and published league tables of 
                                                                                                                                                 
of investment in the science base…. Pillar 4: Best Practice…. we earmarked an extra £20m for best 
practice activity. Pillar 5: Raising Skills and Education Levels…. Pillar 6: Modern Infrastruc-
ture…. we have set out a 10-year plan to modernize the transport network at a cost of £181 mil-
lion …. strategy to increase broadband penetration. Pillar 7: The Right Market Framework …. 
competition framework…. free and fair trade… .sensible minimum standards in the workplace. 
Action … .to reform the planning system to meet business concerns.   10
performance, closed failing schools, and encouraged joint private-public investment in 
new capital equipment in the education sector. 
6. Altering the Balance of Rights and Responsibilities. The New Labour Government 
has also been willing to give workers more than skills. It has given them new individual 
rights at work, particularly of late: initially a guaranteed minimum wage, and more re-
cently slightly improved rights, longer paid maternity leave, unpaid paternity leave, and 
the right to request flexible working hours―these latter all designed to make the combi-
nation of work and childcare easier, to alter what ministers increasingly refer to as “the 
work-life balance.”  What the Government has been less enthusiastic about―and here, of 
course, is one of New Labour’s huge breaks from Old Labour―is the granting to workers 
of more collective rights, rights as members of trade unions. New Labour did amend the 
Thatcherite anti-union labor codes just once, and just slightly: to allow union recognition 
when 50 percent of the workforce indicated such a preference, and to make illegal the 
dismissal of striking workers for at least the first six weeks of those strikes. But that was 
all―just six weeks (it is now up to twelve!) but no unalloyed right to strike, and all the 
other European legislative initiatives (like the Working Time Directive)  implemented 
only in the most parsimonious of manners. All this because of New Labour’s determi-
nation, in Tony Blair’s often cited words, to leave the UK with what it inherited from the 
Conservatives: namely “the most lightly regulated labor market of any leading economy 
in the world.” Indeed much of New Labour’s lack of enthusiasm for greater European 
integration―the bit of the lack of enthusiasm that hasn’t rested in the desire for mone-
tary independence―has rested here, in a share lack of enthusiasm (by both Blair and 
Brown) for the enhanced labor codes of the European Union. 
Two other things about this six-fold policy package, before its exposition is com-
plete: its subterranean radicalism, and the divisions within its delivery.  
The radicalism first: all this new-growth, theory-inspired economic policy has 
been combined, particularly through Gordon Brown’s influence, with what many com-
mentators have called policies of “redistribution by stealth”―a strand of subterranean 
radical policy designed to correct major social injustices without frightening away for-
eign and domestic investors. Every budget has quietly redistributed the tax burden inch-
by-inch away from working adults with children: first through the introduction of a 
working family tax credit of a recognizably American kind, that effectively raised the 
minimum wage for workers with children, and then through a new child tax credit that 
did the same. The Brown budgets did not provide much help for low-paid workers 
without children―not until very recently anyway―but they systematically and incre-
mentally provided help for low-paid workers with children, and help for retired work-
ers surviving on state pensions alone. This has been and remains a government that is 
publicly committed to halving the number of children in poverty in the UK by 2010, and 
to the eradication of child poverty there entirely by 2020. It is also a government that has 
lately worked hard to bring UK aid spending up towards the European average, and 
one that from the outset worked to ease the burden of debt carried by the poorest of 
Third World countries. It is also a government that has really woken up to the difficul-
ties of combining child care and paid work for both parents in a family, and will go to 
the country in May promising what it calls “wrap-around schooling”: school buildings 
open from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., all year round, providing day care for children during 
out of school hours.   11
All this radicalism and social sensitivity has then given New Labour in power a 
certain Janus-face quality. Seen from one side, this is a progressive government serious 
about domestic poverty, family pressures and global injustice. Seen from the other side, 
this is a government that is incipiently authoritarian: at the very least bullying the unem-
ployed off the welfare roles, at the worst driving teachers and nurses to work longer and 
more intensively in some desperate effort to raise public-sector productivity perform-
ances. That authoritarian face has then been reinforced by policies on crime, law and or-
der, freedom of information and now migration, that Tony Blair himself has largely or-
chestrated, and which I will not take you through here: but the cumulative impact has 
certainly been enough to leave traditional Labour supporters, as they now go to the 
polls, literally all over the place: sequentially hot and cold on the adequacy of the New 
Labour  record or, more likely, increasingly cold on the Blair record (not least because of 
Iraq), but selectively (and I mean selectively) warm on the Brown one.  
And to put it that way is to underscore the other general feature of this policy 
package, and one of which many people must already be aware: that the New Labour at-
tempt to raise the UK’s trend rate of growth is being developed and delivered by a gov-
ernment that is increasingly divided at its very core by clashes of personal ambition and 
by differences of goal and philosophy. The clash of ambitions is clear: between the Prime 
Minister and his Chancellor. These days the New Labour government is really, in parlia-
mentary terms, two armed camps: camps that are reluctantly obliged to hang together 
lest they hang separately, and camps that are increasingly estranged by Tony Blair’s re-
peated refusal to stand down in favor of his Chancellor, and by Gordon Brown’s in-
creasingly public distress at that refusal. The difference in philosophy between those 
two camps is less clear, and may indeed run less deep, but certainly the Blair supporters 
and the Brown supporters have disagreed publicly, and continue to disagree publicly, 
about the extent to which publicly provided welfare services in the UK can safely be 
shared with private providers without undermining their universalistic character. The 
extent to which private finance and private management teams should compete with 
public finance and public servants in the provision of welfare services in the UK is cur-
rently a political minefield within the Labour Government itself. For his part, Tony Blair 
is as keen a pro-marketeer as he ever was: indeed there are times these days when he 
seems positively neo-Thatcherite in his enthusiasm for private sector presence and mod-
els within the publicly-provided welfare services. His Chancellor is more prone to sound 
Old Labour on all this, more prone to discuss the dangers of such an approach―par-
ticularly in relation to the National Health Service―but even he, the Chancellor, regu-
larly defends PFI and PSA initiatives before skeptical trade union and party audiences; 
and even he is currently locked in battle with civil service unions whose members face 
redundancy or redeployment because of his determination to raise the productivity of 
public-sector service provision. So we have a determined government, for sure; occa-
sionally a progressive one; but increasingly a divided one: the question that remains is 
whether, divided or not, it is also an effective one.   12
III 
Well, is it?  Is New Labour working 
As ever, the answer is both yes and no. Yes it is working in a surface sense, work-
ing well enough very probably to allow Labour to win re-election on a diminished ma-
jority. But in a deeper sense, it does not seem to me to be working at all. It may yet. New 
Labour policies may indeed be moving the UK in broadly the right direction, but so far 
at least they has made precious little impact on the legacy that New Labour inherited, 
particularly on those dimensions of that legacy that it entered office most determined to 
change. 
So superficially yes: Economically, the UK is currently enjoying its fiftieth unbro-
ken quarter of economic growth, which is an all time record. Living standards since 1997 
in the UK have risen steadily, and faster than in the 1990s. Unemployment is down to 4.7 
percent: in fact from 2001 to 2005, 1.5 million new jobs were created in the UK economy, 
more than off-setting the million that were lost. In job creation at least, the economic re-
cord of the UK under New Labour stands comparison to that of the United States, and 
overall is more impressive than that of Western Europe taken as a whole. Politically New 
Labour managed to repeat its 1997 electoral landslide in 2001, something no Labour 
Party had ever done before, and is set fair, I think, to win a third term―if probably with 
a significantly reduced majority―when (or rather if, as anticipated) it goes to the country 
again in May 2005. 
So with all this achieved, why carp? Why not just operate on this day-to-day 
level, and applaud success.  
Let’s go back to the legacies to see why. 
What New Labour has not achieved is any significant increase in the trend rate of 
growth of the UK economy as a whole. What it has done is to carry on, and to quicken 
slightly, the trajectory of incremental expansion that it inherited from the Conservatives. 
New Labour in power didn’t waste that trajectory. That much at least is good. But nor 
thus far has it changed its fundamentals.  Indeed New Labour policy has made a num-
ber of those economic fundamentals slightly worse. Two in particular of the underpin-
nings of UK prosperity actually weakened under New Labour, and to a frightening de-
gree. The level of personal debt sustaining consumer spending soared dramatically after 
1997; it now stands at a staggering $85,000 per family in the UK. New Labour’s prosper-
ity is built on tick, on spending now money that has to be earned later. And if that were 
not fragility enough, the low interest rates enabling that bridging to be done stand 
threatened by the scale of the UK’s overseas debts. These are now at record levels. Like 
the U.S., the UK does not pay its way in the world. In 2004 the UK’s balance-of-
payments deficit, at £53.2 billion in the first eleven months alone, represented a shortfall 
approaching 3 percent of UK GDP. This is a rake’s progress on an unprecedented scale, 
and one that cannot indefinitely continue. 
At its core, it is a rake’s progress that reflects the continuing inability of New La-
bour to generate a manufacturing miracle in the still de-industrializing UK. The imbal-
ance between production and consumption of manufactured goods inherited in 1997 has 
actually grown worse under New Labour. The government’s own Department of Trade 
and Industry continues to bewail the under-investment, and low R&D performance, of   13
UK-based industry, and the persisting lack of skills of large sections of the UK labor 
force: but New Labour has found, as governments before it also found, that with the UK 
employing class it can bring the horse to water but it cannot make it drink. Indeed its 
capacity as a government to trigger competitive improvements from the UK manu-
facturing base is actually diminishing over time, as Gordon Brown has now so reduced 
levels of corporate taxation as to increasingly denude himself of any effective policy 
weapons with which to micro-manage industrial change. UK manufacturing output re-
mains stuck, in 2005, at its 2001 level. 
In consequence the UK economy remains, as it was in 1997, the home of a gener-
ally poorly paid, overworked, low skilled and highly stressed labor force. The figures on 
this are everywhere. The average pay of manufacturing workers in the UK is still signifi-
cantly lower than that of their European, American and Japanese equivalents. Four mil-
lion of the seven million workers in the European Union whose average working week 
exceeds the forty-eight-hour maximum set by the European Working Time Directive, 
four million of those seven million workers who are putting in the long hours are doing 
so in the UK. In fact the average UK worker in 2003 put in a remarkable seven hours and 
twenty-four minutes of unpaid overtime each week! Remarkable hours, and remarkable 
stress: a third of all UK teachers, for example, took time off for job-related stress in 2003 
alone: an 11 percent increase in absenteeism over a five year period. New Labour may 
not be working, but Labour voters certainly are: very very hard indeed! 
All that can claimed, I think, is that the government has belatedly woken up to 
some of the social consequences of this high stress, low-investment economy. Ministers 
have done nothing about income inequalities at the top level. UK-based CEOs still pay 
themselves the highest rates in Europe: the typical CEO package in 2001 in UK was 28 
percent higher than the year before, and 33 percent higher than the next big European 
payer that year, the French. That brought no effective government response. Instead 
New Labour has worked away at the bottom, easing the lot of the really poor, but over-
all inequality remains largely undisturbed. And though now ministers are promising 
wrap-around schooling, so that hard-pressed parents can work even longer, the actual 
reality of child care availability in the UK is that, in the main cities in particular, it is still  
staggeringly expensive. The latest figures that I have seen report the typical cost of child 
care in the capital in 2003 as $370 a week, though it is not uncommon for parents to pay 
as much as $150 a day for child care, and that on top of escalating costs for housing and 
transport. 
For New Labour is currently presiding over a housing crisis of monumental pro-
portions. As we speak, in 94 percent of all the towns and cities in the UK, accordingly to 
a survey by the major building society published early in 2005, people of average in-
come could not afford to buy any housing at all, and were in consequence obliged to 
rent. A deposit on a starter home in 1997 averaged $9000 in the UK. Today it averages 
$50,400, for a labor force whose average gross pay is still less than $40,000 a year. As a 
result, there are now literally hundreds of towns and cities in New Labour Britain in 
which housing is beyond the reach of the vast majority of the public servants whose la-
bor is vital to the maintenance of basic services there: 496 towns and cities (out of the top 
634) in which house-ownership is beyond the reach of a nurse on average pay, 400 in 
which it is  beyond the reach of a police officer on average pay, 390 in which it is beyond 
the reach of a teacher on average pay, even 251 in which house ownership is beyond the   14
reach of an average firefighter. And the government’s recent panicky response, to sud-
denly build 60,000 new homes in the southeast, can then only bring transport systems 
there to an even greater bottleneck, and intensify the already striking north-south di-
vide. New Labour inherited an unequal society of depleted social capital. It currently 
presides over one that not only remains scarred by deep inequalities, but also one that is 
increasingly gridlocked by the interlocking costs of housing, transport and child care. 
 
IV 
When we ask why, then the other side of the legacy kicks in: the legacy brought 
by New Labour to power. The UK is increasingly gridlocked, trapped between a shrink-
ing manufacturing base and an overheated housing market, because of the paucity of 
policy weapons that New Labour brought to its task. It came to power shorn by its own 
decisions of the full range of industrial policy weapons available in the past. It came to 
power highly critical of European managed markets that had generated higher growth 
and social provision than those available in Thatcherite Britain; and it came to power 
committed (indeed enthusiastic) about the possibilities of economic growth through a 
free-trade-based global order. That enthusiasm was misplaced, those criticisms were 
misdirected, and those policy weapons had been discarded in error. 
For there is no third way solution to the accumulated legacies of long-term 
under-development, certainly not in the Third World and arguably not in the First. 
There may be no solution at all. Maybe it is the case that once economies have fallen be-
hind, they have to stay behind. But let us hope not. What we do know is that they will 
stay behind if all they are subject to are third way growth strategies based on investment 
in human capital. Re-skilling may be an essential ingredient in a successful growth stra-
tegy, but it is not a substitute for one. Strategies of progressive competitiveness of the 
third way kind do not work in the long term for anyone. They particularly don’t work as 
strategies of economic catch-up, of the kind required by a New Labour government in 
search of a higher growth trajectory for a UK economy that was underperforming.  
Let me explain why. 
  Third way “investment in human capital” growth strategies don’t 
work for anyone in the long term: all that happens, as every government in the 
advanced world tries to attract mobile industrial capital by re-skilling its labor 
force and improving its numeracy and literacy levels, all that happens is that 
everyone has to run faster just to stand still. It’s like a treadmill, with the speed 
progressively raised. All the runners do is speed up to remain in the same place, 
and to avoid slipping backwards. The only winner is the treadmill itself, as   
teachers crack under the pressure, students continue to underperform, and   
wages and benefits continue to tumble―in a race to the bottom that is actually 
being driven by the weight of competition from Asian labor forces that are paid a 
pittance of ours.  
  Third way “investment in human capital” growth strategies par-
ticularly don’t work as a catch-up strategy for industrial economies in decline, 
like the UK one inherited by New Labour in 1997: for in a global market free-for-
all, logics of cumulative causation kick in early and then stay dominant―the   15
strong get stronger and the weak get weaker, as unregulated capital flows enable 
UK-based financial institutions to invest abroad, thereby widening the perform-
ance gaps still further. Whistling in the wind is no substitute for effective policy, 
and whistling in the wind is what New Labour ministers are increasingly having 
to do as UK capital continues to shift abroad 
The issue facing the Democratic Left across the advanced capitalist world, and 
certainly facing it in the UK where it currently enjoys the levers of power, is whether 
there is a fourth way that can achieve an industrial renaissance that third way policies so 
far have not; and if there is, whether New Labour third way policies can be recalibrated 
in that general direction. To my mind, finding that elusive “fourth way is the vital task 
facing all progressive forces in advanced capitalism in the first decades of the new cen-
tury. If those elements were obvious, strong left-wing coalitions would already have 
emerged to demand them. In the case of the Labour Party, at least, they have not. Those 
elements have yet to be found. But to my mind they will and must include, at the very 
least, a more active industrial policy, a less stealth-like redistribution of income and 
power, and the repositioning of the UK into the very heart of the EU project (and into 
the defense of the European welfare capitalist model) that Gordon Brown so visibly dis-
likes. Trade policy, membership in the Euro, a more active European regional policy, 
publicly provided venture capital, and higher levels of personal taxation: all these 
things―now off the agenda―will need to be brought back onto it if Labour’s third term 
is not to be wasted, if New Labour’s third way is to be recalibrated into a fourth. 
The housing crisis, and the deepening transport difficulties, are triggering that 
recalibration to some degree, in the UK at least. New Labour is now trying to build a set 
of starter homes. A majority of people polled in the UK now do favor the renationaliza-
tion of the rail system. There is a constituency for change, out there, opening up, grow-
ing daily in front of New Labour. The tragedy we face in the UK, from a progressive 
point of view at least, is that, as in 1997, New Labour may be too cautious to exploit that 
radical space, and so once more let the momentum for change fade. 
Right now, the main blockage to that radical pick-up, within the Labour Party, 
would appear to be Tony Blair himself. The imperfect alternative would appear to be his 
Chancellor, Gordon Brown. And here is the political paradox at the heart of the current 
New Labour tragedy: to the degree that Gordon Brown is a genuine and more radical 
alternative in policy terms to Tony Blair, the Blairites will resist him the harder; and to 
the degree that he is not–to the degree that he, like Blair, is in truth an embedded third 
wayer, who is just better at sugarcoating his conservative message than his leader―then 
if they fail to block him, Gordon Brown will fulfill his personal ambition only then to 
disappoint the ambitions of the rest of us. In the UK, the future does lie indeed with La-
bour, electorally and in the medium term at least. but the danger is that it may be a 
wasted future, as wasted in its way as were the wasted years of Thatcherism that pre-
ceded it. My own personal fear is that, when the New Labour governments are exam-
ined with the hindsight of history, they will turn out to have scored high on intention 
and on coherence, but low on delivery and on impact. I genuinely hope that that fear is 
misplaced, that this time I am wrong, but so far I fear that sadly that I am not. 
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